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ABSTRACT 
 
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN), composed of a huge number of 
resource-constrained sensors can be used for a large number of security-
sensitive applications. Regardless of the type of application, smooth 
collection and delivery of data from this type of network is one of the critical 
requirements. If the data supply process is hampered and thus the expected 
services become unavailable due to the intentional attempts of the 
adversaries, we consider this as a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. As DoS 
attack targets to jeopardize the usual services, it can often drastically curtail 
the utility of wireless sensor network. In this short communication, we 
explore the meaning of DoS in WSN, its effective mitigation techniques, and 
recent issues and challenges in this research area.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) can be utilized for a wide range of 
applications and services that often require high level security. This security 
encompasses a large number of challenges ranging from the nature of wireless 
communications, deployment model of the network, unattended environment, 
large and dense network, disconnected network, presence of physical stimuli, etc. 
Examples of some of the security-sensitive applications of WSN are; moving 
object tracking, intruder detection in a particular area, patient monitoring in 
hospital while the patient data are to be kept secret, military reconnaissance, 
volcano monitoring, disaster management and warning system, and the like. In 
addition to ensuring confidentiality and fidelity of acquired data, these 
applications demand smooth transmission of information throughout the network. 
This requires unscathed service and continuous availability of network resources 
for the full duration of the network’s operation. However, the sensors that build 
up a WSN are generally low-cost devices that are equipped with limited memory, 
processing, radio, and battery reserves. Moreover, considering the conditions of 
low-cost deployment of WSN and tiny size of sensors, it is difficult to increase the 
capabilities of sensors even with the state-of-the-art technology. Hence, for any 
task in WSN, the goal is to ensure the best possible utilization of sensor resources 
so that the network could be kept functional as long as possible. In contrast to this 
crucial objective of sensor network management, a Denial of Service (DoS) attack 
targets to jeopardize the efficient use of network resources and disrupts the 
essential services in the network. Because of the wide range of methods used for 
creating a denial of service situation in the network, DoS attack could be 
considered as one of the major threats against WSN security. 
 
 
DENIAL OF SERVICE AND DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACK 
 
Strictly speaking, we consider any kind of attempt of an adversary to disrupt, 
subvert, or destroy the network as a denial of service attack. In practicality, a DoS 
situation can occur due to any kind of incident that diminishes, eliminates, or 
hinders the normal activities of the network. Say for example, any kind of 
hardware failure, software bug, resource exhaustion, environmental condition, or 
any type of complicated interaction of these factors can create denial of service. It 
should be noted that the term ‘DoS’ indicates to a particular situation in the 
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network and when DoS situation occurs due to an intentional attempt of an 
adversary, it is called DoS attack. 
DoS attacks can mainly be categorized into three types: 
 
1) Consumption of scarce, limited, or non-renewable resources 
2) Destruction or alteration of configuration information 
3) Physical destruction or alteration of network resources 
 
Among these three types of DoS attacks, the first one is the most significant 
for wireless sensor networks as the sensors in the network suffer from the lack of 
enough resources. Other than this type of categorization, layer wise categorization 
(somewhat reduced version of the layers in Open System Interconnect reference 
model) of DoS attacks can also be done. An attacker can choose different targets 
at different layers to stop proper functioning of legitimate nodes so that they 
cannot get the services they are entitled to.  
 
 
LAYER WISE DOS ATTACKS IN WSN: ISSUES AND 
MITIGATION MECHANISMS 
 
Layer wise categorization of DoS attacks was first presented by Wood and 
Stankovic [1]. Raymond and Midkiff [2] later enhanced the survey with some 
updated information. In this section, we discuss current DoS attacks based on 
various protocol layers and their mitigation mechanisms in wireless sensor 
networks.  
Jamming and node tampering are two well-known DoS attacks in the physical 
layer. Jamming means the deliberate interference with radio reception to deny a 
target's use of a communication channel. Various types of jamming (Constant, 
Deceptive, Random, and Reactive) [3] are difficult to handle in case of sensor 
networks. This is because the sensors have such limited resources that if an 
attacker with high power and transmission range starts to disrupt the 
communications of the sensors, they cannot carry on their normal activities. Such 
an attacker can make a large portion of the network inaccessible and useless. 
There are some solutions available to defend against jamming attacks in WSN 
like; use of spread-spectrum, priority messages, lower duty cycle, region mapping, 
and mode change. However, most of these proposed mechanisms often prove to 
be expensive and unfeasible for use in wireless sensor networks. Often the sensors 
have very simple radios that do not have the capabilities to use sophisticated 
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jamming protection methods. The second type of DoS attack, physical tampering 
of sensors could be resisted using camouflaging of sensors, efficient design of 
sensor circuitry, or tamper-proofing mechanisms for sensors. Say for example, if a 
WSN is deployed over a rocky mountain area, the sensors could be shielded with 
a rocky outfit so that it becomes harder for a physical intruder to find them out 
and physically tamper them. Tamper-proofing methods like self-destruction or 
erasing important information from memory under a physical attack situation 
might also be a good solution. However, if low-cost requirement of WSN is to be 
maintained, tamper-proofing methods are inefficient as their inclusion increases 
the cost of each sensor in the network. 
In the link layer, three main DoS attacks are collision, battery exhaustion, and 
unfairness. Error correcting codes (ECC) can be used for resisting collision. 
However, use of ECC incurs more processing and communication overheads. The 
second type of link layer attack, battery exhaustion can be launched with repeated 
requests for using the wireless channel. A naive link layer implementation could 
be an easy target for battery exhaustion attack. Feasible defense mechanisms 
against battery exhaustion caused by repeated transmissions can be the use of time 
division multiple access (TDMA) or rate limitation. The third type of attack, 
unfairness is a weaker form of DoS attack. This threat may not entirely prevent 
legitimate access to the channel, but can degrade service for real time MAC 
protocols. Use of small frames could be helpful in handling unfairness in WSN 
though this particular issue may be regarded as a separate research issue related to 
fairness in sensor networks. Raymond and Midkiff [2] talk about denial-of-sleep 
attack, however this is basically a form of battery exhaustion attack where the 
attacker prevents the radio of a sensor node from going into sleep mode and thus 
tries to drain the energy resources of sensors. 
In the routing layer, DoS attacks are; spoofing, replaying, misdirection of 
traffic, hello flood attack, and homing. Arbitrary handling of network traffic with 
spoofing, replaying, and misdirection could be resisted by using egress filtering, 
authorization, and monitoring while hello flood attack could be mitigated using 
pairwise authentication of nodes or by using geographic routing. The last type of 
routing layer attack, homing attack has a different flavor. It tries to block the 
normal functioning of the special-purpose nodes in the network. As there might be 
several sub-ordinate nodes under one such node (say for example, a cluster head 
in a clustered network), hindering the services of this key node can hamper the 
activities of all other dependent nodes and thus a portion of the network might 
become useless. Different types of cryptographic schemes, algorithms, 
management message hiding, secure clustering [4], etc. can be used for preventing 
homing attack. 
Denial of Service in Wireless Sensor Networks: Issues and Challenges 5 
Flooding and desynchronization are the two common attacks in the transport 
layer. While packet authentication mechanism could handle desyncrhonization 
attack, flooding could be mitigated using client puzzles or traceback mechanisms. 
However, it should be noted that using traceback mechanism in WSN might be 
difficult because of scarcity of resources, random failure of nodes, and 
intermittent communications among the participant nodes. 
In the application layer, some DoS attacks can be launched. If the 
communications of nodes in a WSN are triggered by each occurred event, an 
application layer DoS attack could be launched by using some external physical 
stimuli. In such a case, the attacker uses the external stimuli to stimulate the nodes 
with huge number of events to be sent towards the base station. This attack is not 
effective when sensor readings are sent after making a gist or with regular 
intervals (for example, a clustered network where the clusterheads collect the raw 
data first and then send reports to the base station after certain intervals). On the 
other hand, some type of intrusion detection mechanism (IDM) can be used to 
detect the presence of any external entity in the network if a particular region 
creates a large volume of readings within a short period. An effective IDM can 
prevent the instant triggering of sensors by notifying the presence of intruder in 
the network and isolating it or ignoring it. However, such type of IDM is difficult 
to develop as sensor nodes cannot determine the legitimacy of a particular 
physical stimulus rather they only sense the event and get triggered. Path based 
DoS (PDoS) attack [5] is another kind of application layer DoS attack. Each of the 
nodes in a path towards the base station needs to participate in the forwarding 
process of a particular packet containing sensor readings. If a large number of 
bogus packets are sent through a path towards the base station, it can keep the 
nodes busy, deny transmission of legitimate traffic by occupying network 
resources, and significantly drain the resources of the sensors. Use of various 
authentication mechanisms or replay protection mechanism could be the effective 
countermeasures against this type of attack. A third type of application layer 
attack could be launched if a WSN allows reprogramming of the network. 
Reprogramming of a sensor network may be needed for version control, scope 
selection, encoding-decoding, code dissemination, completion validation, code 
acquisition, switching to a new program, and/or for network management purpose 
[6]. In these cases, if the process of reprogramming is not secure enough, the 
attackers can actively cut off a portion of the network by using bogus messages. 
Good authentication mechanism for the whole process can resist this type of 
attack. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Other than the mentioned attacks, many other attacks like wormhole attack or 
sybil attack can also cause denial of service situation in the network. In fact, many 
attack mechanisms and targets of attacks overlap with each other; but considering 
different circumstances, they are given different tags and names. Among all types 
of DoS attacks in WSN, physical layer attacks are the most difficult to handle. 
This is because the sensors are not built with powerful radios or the nature of 
wireless sensor network needs unattended environment. More efforts may be 
given to develop efficient jamming protection methods or we may need to wait for 
the technological advancements so that the sensors get enough low-cost resources 
to fight against any type of physical attack. For all the layers, though it is often 
quite difficult to know whether any particular DoS situation in WSN is caused 
intentionally or unintentionally, there are some common detection and defense 
mechanisms. In this short communication, we have discussed these current issues 
and challenges. As DoS attack covers a large number of attacks and threats in 
WSN, finding efficient mechanisms for effective prevention of DoS situations still 
remains as an open research issue. As “Prevention is better than cure”, future 
research efforts should mainly be directed towards developing DoS prevention 
mechanisms instead of searching for “cures”. 
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